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Logical Space and Phase-Space 
 
Abstract  
One prominent account of Wittgenstein’s notion of logical space, due to 
Stephen Toulmin and Allan Janik, ties that notion to the notion of phase-space 
in the scientific work of Ludwig Boltzmann. I cast doubt upon this attempt to 
link these notions, and evaluate whether any of the classic conceptions of 
logical space in the early commentaries on the Tractatus make logical space 
into a kind of phase-space. I conclude that for Wittgenstein and these 
commentators, logical space is a quasi-linguistic space, but that this is what 
precludes it being at the same time a phase-space.  
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Introduction  
 Given its importance in the Tractatus, and its influence beyond that book, 
the existing scholarly literature features remarkably few accounts of 
Wittgenstein’s notion of logical space. One prominent such account, originally 
suggested by Stephen Toulmin and then elaborated upon in Allan Janik & 
Toulmin’s book Wittgenstein’s Vienna, ties that notion to the notion of phase-
space in the scientific work of Ludwig Boltzmann and Heinrich Hertz. I will 
cast doubt upon this attempt to link these notions, and evaluate whether any of 
the classic conceptions of logical space in the early commentaries on the 
Tractatus make logical space into a kind of phase-space. I conclude that for 
Wittgenstein and these commentators, logical space is a quasi-linguistic space, 
but that this very fact is what precludes it being at the same time a phase-space, 
properly so-called.  
 
Logical Space and Phase-Space  
 One aspect of Ludwig Boltzmann’s scientific work that has sometimes 
been thought to leave its mark on the Tractatus is his development of the idea of 
phase space. Stephen Toulmin seems to have been the first person to make this 
suggestion, in a 1969 article on Wittgenstein where he claimed that: ‘the pages 
of the Tractatus echo with phrases – “logical spaces”, comprising “ensembles of 
possibilities” etc. – which have roots in Boltzmann’s generalised 
thermodynamics’ (Toulmin 1969a, p.66). In another article from the same year 
we find Toulmin claiming: ‘An axiomatic theory, [Wittgenstein] had argued, 
defines only a formal ensemble of possibilities in “logical space”. (It was no 
accident that he had borrowed his nomenclature from Boltzmann’s and 
Liouville’s statistical thermodynamics)’ (Toulmin 1969b, p.38).  
 A few years later, in Wittgenstein’s Vienna, Toulmin and Allan Janik 
explained Boltzmann’s procedure thus:  
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Boltzmann took Hertz’s account of mechanics as defining a system of 
‘possible sequences of observed events’ and made it the starting point for 
a general method of theoretical analysis in physics itself. He did so, by 
treating each independent property of a physical system as defining a 
separate coordinate in a multidimensional system of geometrical 
coordinates. All the possible locations of each separate body in the 
physical system, for instance, were ordered along three spatial ‘axes of 
reference’; all values of, say, temperature, along another axis; all values 
of, say, pressure, along a fifth; and so on. The totality of theoretical 
‘points’ in the resulting multidimensional coordinate system gave one a 
representation of the ‘ensemble of possible states’ of the physical system 
in question; and any actual state could be defined by specifying the 
particular point in this ‘multidimensional space’ whose coordinates 
corresponded to the actual values of all the variables. The general 
problem for statistical mechanics was then to discover mathematical 
relations governing the frequencies with which – on various assumptions 
and conditions – the actual states of a physical system would be 
distributed among its possible states; and, so, to compute the relative 
probabilities of finding the system, in actual fact, in one overall physical 
state rather than another (Janik & Toulmin 1973, pp.143-4).  
 
Janik and Toulmin then make the link to the Tractatus thus:  
 
this notion of a ‘space of theoretical possibilities’, which plays the key 
part in Boltzmann’s method of analysis, can be summarised concisely in 
words from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as follows: 
The facts in logical space are the world [1.13]; the world divides into 
facts [1.2]; each item can be the case or not the case while everything else 
remains the same… [1.21] We construct for ourselves representations 
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[Bilder] of facts [2.1]. A Bild depicts reality by representing a possibility 
of existence and non-existence of states of affairs [2.201]. A Bild 
represents a possible situation in logical space [2.202]. A proposition 
determines a place in logical space… [3.4] In geometry and logic alike a 
place is a possibility: something can exist in it [3.411]. (ibid., p.144).
1
  
  
 Among more recent commentators, Michael Lockwood certainly 
endorses Janik and Toulmin’s claim that Wittgenstein’s concept of logical space 
is ‘transparently modelled on Boltzmann’s use of the concept of phase space’, 
adding that Boltzmann thus ‘unwittingly made his mark on philosophy as well 
as physics’ (Lockwood 2005, p.219).  
 
Evaluation of these Claims  
 These claims have several problematic features. First, the idea that 
Boltzmann made Hertz’s account of mechanics the starting point for a general 
method of theoretical analysis in physics is demonstrably false. Hertz’s 
Principles of Mechanics (1894) had been published by the time Boltzmann 
published the work in question here, his Vorlesungen über Gastheorie (1896, 
1898). But Boltzmann mentions Hertz’s book only once in these lectures, and 
there specifically to remark that he had ‘abandoned’ his own attempt to try out 
‘a gas theory in which, instead of forces acting during collisions, one merely has 
conditional equations in the sense of the posthumous mechanics of Hertz’ 
(Boltzmann 1964, p.26). In fact, Boltzmann was never very impressed by 
Hertz’s mechanics, finding it unworkable even on simple problems, and he did 
not model any of his own work on it. The fairly common assumption, by 
Wittgenstein scholars, that Boltzmann somehow developed Hertz’s mechanics, 
                                                          
1
 These ideas don’t feature in the chapter on Boltzmann in Janik’s much later book 
Assembling Reminders (Janik 2006), but Janik is there concerned with influences on 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.  
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is a complete myth.  
 Second, Janik and Toulmin’s description of phase-space is strange in that 
it omits what seems to be a most important aspect of that concept as it occurs in 
physics, which is the evolution of the system in question. That is, what 
physicists usually do when they represent a system in phase-space is to study 
the system’s trajectories through that space, the way it evolves over time. Janik 
and Toulmin’s description, by contrast, seems static, and one wonders whether 
they thought that Wittgenstein’s notion of logical space had this same feature.  
 Third, and finally, claims that terms from the Tractatus (‘logical space’, 
‘ensembles of possibilities’) originate either in Boltzmann’s thermodynamics or 
in the earlier, purely mathematical work of Joseph Liouville are also clearly 
false. The term ‘ensemble’ doesn’t even occur in the Tractatus, so what 
Toulmin meant by saying that it has roots in, and was borrowed from, 
Boltzmann’s thermodynamics is obscure. In the aforementioned Vorlesungen 
über Gastheorie, (which we don’t even know whether Wittgenstein had read), 
neither ‘Ensemble’ nor ‘Ansammlung’ occur at all, and ‘Möglichkeit’ 
(possibility) occurs only three times, none of which occurrences is suggestive of 
the way in which the concept is used in the Tractatus. When it comes to the 
concept of logical space, too, ‘logisch’ occurs only twice in Boltzmann’s text, 
once in the phrase ‘logisch Consequenzen’, and once in ‘logische 
Notwendigkeit’ (both in §14). Related tractarian terms are also much harder to 
find in this same text than Janik and Toulmin’s remarks lead one to expect. 
‘Raum’ itself occurs only ten times, none of them references to anything other 
than ordinary physical space. Finally, the case is even shakier if we turn to 
Boltzmann’s Vorlesungen über die Principe der Mechanik, the two volumes of 
which (published 1897, 1904) we do know Wittgenstein owned, since none of 
the terms in question occur there at all.  
 As for Liouville, the acclaimed author of the definitive volume on his 
work describes as ‘absurd’ the idea that he ever contributed to statistical 
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mechanics, and goes on: ‘It is indeed unlikely that he ever heard of this new 
approach to the theory of heat, which was being conceived by Maxwell, Gibbs, 
and Boltzmann toward the end of Liouville’s life’ (Lützen 1990, p.663).  
 If Boltzmann didn’t use the expression ‘logical space’, did he at least 
have the idea? Maybe, after all, that’s all that Toulmin really meant. This 
question factors into two: How is the idea of logical space related to the 
physicist’s idea of phase space? And did Boltzmann have the idea of phase-
space?  
 
Boltzmann’s Phase-Space?  
 Surprisingly, it seems that (pace Lockwood, at least) the answer to this 
second question is ‘not quite’. As David D. Nolte explains in a recent article on 
the history of the idea of phase-space in Physics Today (Nolte 2010), the 
sequence of ideas on the topic is as follows. In 1838, Liouville (1808-1892) 
proved the theorem that now bears his name. In lectures given in 1842-3, Carl 
Gustav Jacob Jacobi (1804-1851) realised that the differential equations 
involved in Liouville’s theorem could be applied to mechanical systems. 
Neither of them had the idea of representing such systems within a generalised 
space, though – the idea of space was still limited to physical space of three 
dimensions. The idea of a multidimensional space developed only gradually, 
and largely in the work of German and British geometers. In 1871, Boltzmann 
used Jacobi’s results to derive a conservation theorem. His papers from that 
time, though, ‘contain no use of the language of “phase” or “space”, although 
the conservation of what would later be called phase-space volume for a 
conservative dynamical system appears in its mathematically modern form’ 
(Nolte 2010, p.35). Boltzmann used the term ‘phase’ for the first time in 1872, 
in an article in which he distinguished between the kind of atomic motion and 
its phase. He didn’t use the term again until the publication of the first volume 
of his Vorlesungen über Gastheorie in 1896. Even then, though, as Nolte 
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explains:  
 
Boltzmann still does not seem able to take that final step of speaking of a 
single trajectory through a multidimensional space. All the mathematics 
is in place, and he makes the analogies and uses the geometric language 
of n-fold regions, but he implies the trajectory rather than stating it 
explicitly. That inability is clearly related to the fact that he never uses the 
word ‘space’, and thus does not take the last step to call it ‘phase space’ 
(Nolte ibid., p.36).  
 
To say that Boltzmann had the idea of phase-space, then, is something of an 
idealisation. In fact, the first published occurrence of the term itself came as late 
as 1911, in a famous encyclopaedia review of Boltzmann’s work, although it 
caught on quickly and by 1913 had been used in articles in the Annalen der 
Physik (Nolte ibid., p.38).  
 Of course physicists did have that idea by the time Wittgenstein was 
composing his Tractatus, since Josiah Willard Gibbs (who actually did 
introduce the term ‘ensemble’ (Nolte, p.37)) and Henri Poincaré had both made 
ample use of the idea (if not the term ‘phase space’) in their physical researches. 
Wittgenstein could have picked up the idea of phase space (although he could 
not have been aware of the term) during his training as an engineer, either in 
Berlin (1906-8) or in Manchester (1908-11). Claims that he got the idea from 
Boltzmann, though, should be treated with scepticism.  
 
Is Logical Space Phase-Space?  
 At this point we come to the important question. Boltzmann aside, is the 
‘logical space’ of the Tractatus a kind of phase-space?  
 Given that ‘logical space’ is one of the most famous Tractarian concepts, 
and given the importance its role can be assumed to have there, I think one has 
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to say that there has been remarkably little discussion, in the scholarly literature, 
of exactly how (or whether) the idea might work. There are certain classic 
discussions in the early commentaries by Erik Stenius, James Griffin, and Max 
Black. Recent commentators, by contrast, hardly seem to go into the idea at all, 
and often never even mention it.
2
 Perhaps this is because they are all convinced 
that the idea isn’t important, or that it’s nothing more than a suggestive analogy. 
It would surely be worth seeing whether one can squeeze more out of it than 
that, but this is a much larger project that will not be attempted here. Instead, I 
will consider only whether logical space as the early commentators conceive it 
could be a phase-space.  
 
Anscombe on Logical Space? 
 Before I come to those treatments of logical space which really concern 
me, though, I note that Elizabeth Anscombe has been taken to task for offering 
an inadequate conception of the notion in her 1959 book An Introduction to 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (see Pinkerton & Waldie 1974, pp.15-19). It’s true that 
Anscombe, transiting very quickly and rather superficially from the notion of 
logical form to that of logical space, proceeds to construct what she calls ‘a 
spatial illustration a bit like Wittgenstein’s black spot on white paper’ 
(Anscombe 1959, p.75).  I’ve little doubt that Pinkerton  and Waldie are right to 
complain that what follows could not be an adequate illustration of 
Wittgenstein’s notion of logical space. But it’s simply not clear that Anscombe 
meant it to be. Neither of Wittgenstein’s mentions of black spots, to which she 
refers when introducing her analogy, occur within (or nearby) any of his 
remarks about logical space. The first occurs in Tractatus 4.063, when he gives 
what he calls ‘an analogy to illustrate the concept of truth’. The second occurs 
in 6.341, when he tries to explain the nature of mechanics (although here the 
                                                          
2
 The most notable exception is David Hyder, whose book (Hyder 2002) goes into the issue in 
detail.  
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black spots are on a ‘white surface’, and Anscombe’s ‘paper’ isn’t mentioned). I 
suspect Anscombe had the former illustration in mind, but Wittgenstein ties 
neither of them to the idea of logical space.  
 So I suspect either that Anscombe is not a legitimate target in this respect, 
and that in fact she said nothing, in that book, about logical space, or that her 
own association of Wittgenstein’s black spots on white paper with the notion of 
logical space is tenuous.  
 
Logical Space in the Early Commentaries on the Tractatus 
 The crucial question, when considering whether logical space, as 
conceived of within any given treatment, is a phase-space, is what are its 
denizens? That is, what kinds of things feature in logical space, as presented in 
that treatment? As far as I can see, the classic treatments of logical space 
preclude its being a phase-space, since they feature the wrong kind(s) of 
denizens.  
 The best and most detailed of these classic treatments of logical space 
occurs in Erik Stenius’s book Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Critical Exposition of 
the Main Lines of Thought, which devotes an entire chapter to the notion. 
Stenius begins by setting out what he calls a ‘model’ or ‘description’ of a 
‘world’ which consists of five rectangular parallelepipeds of different shapes 
and sizes (Stenius 1960, pp.38-9). The description in question describes fifteen 
independent facts or states of affairs, the length, width and height of each of the 
five parallelepipeds. He then uses this notion of independence to ground the 
idea of the ‘world’ in question having different dimensions: ‘a world has as 
many dimensions as it has mutually independent components of description’ 
(ibid., p.40). At this point Stenius also notes the use of configuration- and 
phase-spaces by physicists:  
 
[A]bove all the number of mutually independent components of 
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description has been an important factor in physical world description. 
Our world is considered by the physicists as a world with an immense 
number of ‘dimensions’ in this sense, and therefore our model can in this 
respect serve as model of descriptions in physics. (ibid., p.41. In his 
footnote here, Stenius mentions Hertz’s Principles of Mechanics as 
containing such a view of the world).  
 
At this point, though, Stenius quite rightly makes it clear that the ‘dimensions’ 
he has referred to are nothing like the dimensions of ‘our ordinary geometrical 
space’ because, as he puts it,  
 
[t]he three-dimensionality of the geometrical space is a characteristic of 
the ‘world as a thing’ whereas the fifteen dimensions of our model world 
refer to this world as a fact. […] This ‘logical space’ is a fifteen-
dimensional ‘space’ of possible places of states of affairs, whereas the 
ordinary geometrical space is a space of possible places of things. What 
the places in logical space are places of belongs to the category of facts, 
whereas what the places in ordinary geometrical space are places of 
belongs to the category of things. (ibid., p.43).  
 
But it is precisely this fact, the fact that the world of the Tractatus is a ‘world as 
a fact’ (Stenius ch.II and pp.43, 48, 52) which renders its ‘logical space’ 
incapable of being a phase-space. A phase-space could contain the world only if 
the world was understood as a thing but this, of course, is just what Tractatus 
1.1 denies. So the ‘logical space’ that Stenius has in mind can’t be a phase-
space.  
 Max Black’s A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus contains more 
than one discussion of logical space, and it’s not clear how they are supposed to 
be linked with one another. But the crucial thing about the two ‘ways of using 
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the analogy of logical space’ which he regards as ‘alternatives’ (Black 1964, 
p.157) is that their denizens are propositions. So, in the first such way of using 
the analogy, Black tells us that ‘logical space is the ordered system of all atomic 
situations’, and atomic propositions correspond to points in logical space, while 
complex propositions correspond to volumes therein (ibid., pp.155, 157). And 
again, in the second way of using the analogy that Black envisages, what have 
‘co-ordinates’ in logical space are propositions, and the co-ordinates of each 
proposition are the names of which it is composed (ibid., p.157). Whether or not 
either of these is the right way to understand what Wittgenstein meant by 
‘logical space’, neither of them will make logical space into a phase-space, 
properly so-called. The operations that propositions admit of, such as negation, 
conjunction, and disjunction, simply cannot feature in phase-spaces. If logical 
space was to feature individual propositions as its denizens, for example, it’s 
hard to see what negating one or more of those propositions would do to the 
phase-space, or what would correspond, in a phase-space, to propositions being 
conjoined or disjoined.  
 Finally, I come to the treatment in James Griffin’s book Wittgenstein’s 
Logical Atomism, also published in 1964. Griffin contends that the essence of 
what he calls ‘Wittgenstein’s metaphor about logical space’ is in fact the mesh 
or grid which makes its appearance in Tractatus 6.341. He says:  
 
The essence of the metaphor is, I think, comparison of a sentence with a 
point in a co-ordinate system, and so names with single co-ordinate 
numbers. In a given co-ordinate system putting two numbers together 
defines a point; in a given language putting two names together makes a 
statement. In this way, languages are a kind of logical co-ordinate system. 
And as there are different co-ordinate systems as a result of choosing 
different points of origin, different scales, and so forth, there are different 
representational forms in language. Now, from these roots all the rest of 
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the metaphor grows. If two names are of forms permitting combination, 
their combination is logically all right; it would be as impossible for a 
conjunction of names to contradict logic as for a pair of co-ordinates to 
contradict geometry. A conjunction will always determine a ‘logical 
place’… Furthermore, as in geometry to specify one set of co-ordinates 
involve the whole apparatus of grid, point of origin, and so on, so the 
determination of one logical place brings along with it a whole 
symbolism with all its rules and operations – or, as Wittgenstein puts it, 
the logical scaffolding will already be given by it. There is a logical place 
corresponding to every state of affairs. And facts, i.e. existent states of 
affairs, when put together, constitute the world, just as all points in a 
place which are occupied, when put together, constitute a geometrical 
figure, the sort which in 6.341 stands for the world which is to be 
described. (Griffin 1964, pp.103-4).  
 
Whatever the merits of this comparison (see Pinkerton & Waldie 1974, pp.9-13 
for a stringent critique), it should be clear that nothing within it is a phase-
space, since it doesn’t feature objects whose properties change over time. In this 
model, in fact, as in Black’s, objects (Tractarian objects, that is) figure only as 
the things that ‘names’ stand for, and if this is a model of logical space, names 
and the statements they make do dwell within logical space, but objects do not. 
This may fit with Wittgenstein’s idea that facts (1.13), and situations (2.11, 
2.202) are in logical space, but it does not allow that the denizens of logical 
space are the kinds of things (objects, processes, phenomena) which populate 
phase-spaces.  
 These commentators may have got Wittgenstein wrong in various ways, 
of course. But I don’t think they have got him wrong in conceiving of a logical 
space as a quasi-linguistic space. It is this, though, which makes logical space 
such an unlikely candidate for being a phase-space. Phase-spaces can contain 
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objects, processes, and their changing properties, but not propositions. If logical 
space does contain quasi-linguistic entities, such as the facts or situations which 
Wittgenstein explicitly tells us it contains (Tractatus 1.13, 2.11), or such as the 
propositions, facts or states of affairs which the commentators I have discussed 
have in mind, the ‘force’ of no such entity could, as Wittgenstein’s explanation 
of logical space requires, ‘reach through the whole of logical space’ (Tractatus 
3.42). Neither could a single proposition ‘give’ the whole of logical space, as an 
earlier clause in that same Tractarian proposition requires. Finally, although one 
may on such a conception be able to make sense of the idea that a tautology 
‘leaves open to reality the whole – the infinite whole – of logical space’, it’s 
hard to see how a contradiction could ‘fill the whole of logical space, leaving no 
point of it for reality’ (Tractatus 4.463). Indeed it’s hard to see how a 
contradiction, that is, a proposition together with its negation, could feature ‘in’ 
logical space at all.  
 
Conclusion  
 On none of these classic accounts of logical space, then, is logical space a 
kind of phase-space. Of course, there’s still the possibility that none of the 
accounts I have covered is correct. (Pinkerton & Waldie 1974 argue for this 
conclusion with respect to all but one of the accounts surveyed here). But if 
what I have said is correct, on no correct account of the Tractatus could its 
logical space be a kind of phase-space. Taken together with what I have 
suggested in the first half of this paper, I conclude that, whatever Boltzmann’s 
influence on Wittgenstein might have been (for this, see Preston Forthcoming), 
claims that the logical space of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are modelled on 
Boltzmann’s conception of phase-space are unjustified.  
 
John Preston, 
Department of Philosophy, 
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The University of Reading, UK 
j.m.preston@reading.ac.uk  
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